A historical legacy: putting conflicts over water resources in the Nile basin to a historical context

As mentioned in an earlier post, much of the conflict between Egypt and other riparian nations in the Nile basin stems from agreements created in the colonial era. It would therefore be appropriate for us to examine these agreements in a bit more detail and understand these agreements, signed some 50 odd years ago could still cast a shadow on current negotiations.

The first set of agreements over the utilisation of water resources in the Nile basin took place in the early part of the 20th century. These are truly colonial agreements: none of the African states (except Ethiopia) were at the negotiations table, as they were all 'represented' by colonial overlords. These series of agreements essentially established the domination of Great Britain in the Nile basin, as no changes to the river flow could take place without prior consent of the British empire. The real game-changer, however, came slightly later at 1929. This was an exchange of notes between Egypt and Great Britain (then representing Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya), formally recognising Egypt's rights to Nile water and assuring that the nation would receive a minimum of 48 billion cubic metres of water per year (Swain, 1997). This agreement has proved to be controversial, as its validity has become a constant source of debate in negotiations between Nile basin nations. Whilst Egypt continues to maintain that the treaty is valid and applicable, other nations argue otherwise. As outlined in what became known as the Nyere Doctrine, it is argued that the agreement was signed by Great Britain and applicable to states under British control, the agreement is automatically voided when the nations declared independence of Great Britain (Okidi, 1994).

Another agreement that still have implications on current negotiations is the 1959 bilateral agreement between Sudan and Egypt. This agreement redivided water allocations between the two nations: Egypt is to receive 55.5 billion cubic metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic metres. This treaty has proved to be crucial for negotiations as Egypt regards the recognition of this treaty (something upstream riparian countries are, predictably, unwilling to do) as the starting point of any negotiations (Cascao, 2009). Sudan and Egypt also agreed to 'present an unified view in any other negotiations concerning the Nile waters' (Carroll, 1999: 280). The coming together of the two strongest powers in region meant that there is significant resistance to any actions that threaten the status quo, and it is only recently when other nations in the region begins to grow in stature that the situation is beginning to change.

Interestingly, whilst many would see these agreements as hindrance to cooperation in the Nile basin, Metawie (2004) actually sees these agreements as signs of bilateral cooperation. Whilst they could be interpreted as bilateral cooperation, it would require some stretch of imagination especially in the case of the 1929 agreement which is in essence a deal between two areas of British control (Egypt being a protectorate of the British empire in all but name at that time). Of course, writing for the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, it is perhaps no surprise that Metawie would like to establish the legitimacy of these agreements and make the case for Egypt to have the greatest say in affairs of the Nile basin due to historic rights.

Examining transboundary aquifers in Africa

Unlike transboundary river basins, transboundary aquifers have received little attention thus far. This is perhaps due to a lack of understanding about how these systems work, but with some of these aquifers found in the world's most water-stressed regions we simply could not afford them any longer. This gap in knowledge has been the primary problem the Internationally Shared Aquifer Resource Management (ISARM) Programme has been set up to address (Puri and Aureli, 2005). ISARM aims to encourage cooperation between nations to eliminate and to encourage more scientific research that provides the data required for a better understanding of transboundary river basins.
The establishment of ISARM can perhaps be justified by the issues that have arose from the intensive use of transboundary aquifers: the consequences of intensive extraction may take place in the upstream riparian country and the extracting nation; the impacts of salt water intrusion and pollution dispersing through groundwater flows. Issues from intensive extraction is accentuated in the case of transboundary aquifers with little recharge as these aquifers are essentially a finite resource. As such, scientific data and international agreements are imperative for the management of these aquifers (Puri and Nasser, 2003).
Groundwater aquifers are especially important in Africa, where groundwater storage is estimated to be 100 times of annual renewable freshwater resources (MacDonald et al., 2012). Groundwater, given its relative independence from meteorological changes and good water quality, is also viewed as a natural buffer against climate change. Perhaps luckily, much of this groundwater is accessible and could be used to sustain community handpumps. Given this fact, groundwater could perhaps be regarded as a viable supplement to overground freshwater resources and a back-up source of freshwater in times of climate variability. However, it is important to note that groundwater storage in most African regions are unable to support large scale irrigation schemes and national governments must keep this in mind whilst exploiting aquifers.
Nevertheless, research on transboundary aquifers in southern Africa gives a cause for hope. Cobbing et al. (2008) suggests that conflicts over the use of transboundary aquifers are not always inevitable and the managing of these aquifers may not be as challenging as previously thought. Instead, they point to the need for technical cooperation and data sharing between nations, which is something that ISARM will be able to address in the near future.
In conclusion, transboundary aquifers in Africa have a lot of potential in solving some of the water-related problems in the continent, but a much better understanding of these aquifers and the processes taking place in them will be required before a suitable framework of management could be produced.

Scene-setting: why is there likely to be increasing conflicts over transboundary resources?

Climate change: It is perhaps no surprise that climate change will make it onto this list. Whilst the impacts of climate change on Africa remains relatively uncertain, it is more than likely that it will have some impact on water resources in the continent. For instance de Wit and Stankiewicz (2006) predicted that climate change is likely to lead to fall in precipitation in Northern and Southern Africa whilst increasing rainfall in East Africa in particular. Indeed the latest IPCC report (2013) has also predicted a precipitation pattern where the wet gets wetter and the dry gets drier with the notable exceptions of Northeast Brazil and East Africa. Whilst there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding such predictions, the possibility of such dramatic changes when coupled with the lack of institutional capability for the majority of African government to deal with these changes is likely to lead to increased conflict over transboundary water resources.

Population growth: Africa is the fastest growing continent in the world in terms of population. The population of sub-Saharan Africa has over tripled between 1950 and 2000 and is expected to double once more by 2060 (World Bank, 2015). This rapid population growth is expected to the cause considerable pressure on food and water in Africa. This pressure is likely to force countries to use available water resources more efficiently and in some cases the demand for water might exceed the supply (Falkenmark, 1990). This need to use all or the majority of available water resources may be a source of international conflict between nations along a river system as an increased extraction of freshwater from nations upstream will directly affect the water available to downstream nations.

However, questions are being raised about to what extent is there a case of water scarcity per se. As Rijsberman (2006) noted, water scarcity may not mean what the general public thinks it means. Whilst many might conceptualise water scarcity as the lack of water to support domestic purposes, this is often not the case: the water need for domestic purposes is actually quite small in comparison to other usages. As such, becoming water scarce as defined by the Falkenmark index is not an indication of a lack of water for drinking and cleaning, but of a lack of water for food production. This therefore raises a question: if water scarcity is more of a problem to do with food production, would importing cheap food from other nations be a viable way of solving conflicts over the usage of transboundary resources in water scarce regions?

Predictions of water scarcity are also questioned due to the way water scarcity is measured. Much of the statistics on water scarcity only calculates blue water (water in rivers, lakes and aquifers) and doesn't take into account green water, which accounts for about 60% of global food production (Savenjie, 2000). As such, a calculation that includes green water is likely to show a much more positive scenario.

In conclusion, whilst there will unquestionably be a higher demand for water resources in the future, the situation might not be as bleak as it seems and there is a good chance that conflicts over transboundary water resources may not happen.

Conflicts on the Nile

  Perhaps the most complex transboundary river basin in Africa is the Nile basin. Shared by 10 different countries, management of this transboundary water resource has been challenging and often a source of conflicts. This blog will investigate how the historical dominance of Egypt in the region has led to a power imbalance in negotiations and how the rise of other nations in the area has increased the tension within the region.
  As one of the earliest human civilisations, Egypt has been the dominant power in the Nile region for much of recorded history. Indeed, this dominant status enjoyed by Egypt has led to a belief among Egyptians that the Nile is a birthright and its use should therefore be controlled by Egypt (Rahman, 2012). Indeed, this notion of Egyptian supremacy has defined water management strategies of the region. Not only is this supremacy reinforced through bilateral agreements that recognises the control exerted by Egypt over the Nile, but also tacitly through the lack of challenge against Egypt's water management decisions by other riparian countries. Indeed, conflicts over the Nile has thus far not troubled Egypt and the nation still feels dominant enough in the region to threaten other riparian countries with war should they undertake measures that would affect Egypt's access to Nile water. Egypt's relative power in the international community has also meant that it is able to gain international support in order negotiate cooperative arrangements that are in its favour. As a result, Egypt has arguably benefited disproportionately from the Nile as its water needs were ensured.
  However, this dominant position is increasingly challenged by the rise of other nations in the region such as Ethiopia. Indeed, Rahman hypothesises that the emerging nation of Ethiopia, coupled by the increasing demand for water due to growing populations, would lead to increased conflicts in the region.

Busting the Water Wars myth: how cooperation is preferred to conflict in Southern Africa

  It has often been suggested that conflicts over water will become increasingly common as the demand for water resources increases and a growing area experiences water scarcity (defined by existing metrics). This notion is not difficult to comprehend: as water becomes a scarce resource, nations will take stronger actions to ensure their water needs are met, thus increasingly the likelihood of conflicts over the distribution of water in trans-boundary water resources. Despite the pessimistic and Malthusian nature of this notion, it is a widely accepted theory that has been backed up by examples and literature. However, the example of Southern Africa would seem to buck this theory and it is upon this example and its analysis by Turton et al. (2010) that this post will be based.
  One of the more striking aspects of the south African example is how on paper conflict should be the far likelier outcome. Water is considered to be a major constraint for development in southern African nations and the colonial legacy (more specifically the arbitrary ways in which national boundaries are created during decolonisation) of region would all seem to suggest the presence of water-related conflicts-- a theory reinforced by the fact that 6 river basins in the region are considered to be 'basins at risk.'
  However despite this designation trans-boundary river basins in southern Africa have remained relatively peaceful, prompting Turton and his colleagues to suggest that there must be an alternative theory to the Water Wars idea at work in the region. After examining researches on river basins across the global, they have came up with an alternate conceptualisation of trans-boundary water resource management they called Hydropolitical Complex. This concept is underpinned by the ideas that a track record of peaceful cooperation is a good indicator of future behaviour and that endemic water scarcity within a shared river basin will produce sufficient incentive for nations to negotiate a long-term resolution rather than resort to violence. The Hydropolitical Complex stipulates that pivotal states (i.e. the more developed nations of the region) and pivotal basins (river basins shared between pivotal states) determine the ways in which trans-boundary water resources will be managed in the region. As such, the fact that the pivotal states in southern Africa have a long history of cooperation even without the existence of clear structure for collaboration could be used to explain the lack of water-related conflict in the region.
  Though the Hydropolitical Complex has only been applied to too limited a set of river basins to be considered universally applicable, it nonetheless offers an alternative view to trans-boundary water resource management; suggesting that trans-boundary water resource management should not focus on independent water resources but on all pivotal basins in the region as a whole.

Sharing is caring? The problems facing trans-boundary water resources management in Africa

  Africa is one of the fastest growing continents in the world in terms of population, and this population growth needs to be supported by a variety of resources the most important of which is water. Unfortunately, water is not a resource that Africa is known for. More devastating perhaps is the fact that the water resources in the continent is unevenly distributed. As pointed out by Peter Ashton (2002), 52.5% of the African continent is home to almost 61% of the continent's population but over 95% of its water resources. This uneven distribution meant that some nations are uniquely powerful in the management of water resources in Africa and their desire to ensure the availability of water within their nation may be the cause of tension and conflicts. This tension is further exacerbated by the fact that 85% of Africa's water resources are trans-boundary river basins (see map).

Map of International River Basins in Africa. Chikozho 2014

  As can be seen from the map, river basins in Africa are complex systems that spread across as much as 10 different nations. This makes the trans-boundary management of water resources difficult but, given the already politically unstable state of many African nations, cooperation is perhaps better than conflict. This idea of international cooperation is also encouraged and enabled through international organisations and their emphasis on building national capacity to achieve their individual river basin management programs. This could be seen in Claudious Chikozho's 2014 article, which highlighted the importance of international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank in providing funds and expert knowledge that allowed trans-boundary river basin management in both the Nile and Senegal basin. Chikozho's article would seem to suggest that the establishment of these trans-boundary river basin organisations (TRBOs) is the solution for trans-boundary river conflicts and is crucial for encouraging development and capacity building in the region, but is this actually true? One of the prerequisites for any form of  TRBO is a stable political environment where national governments have actual control over the water resources and can therefore dictate the ways in which they are managed. The turbulent political nature in the continent therefore poses significant barriers to effective trans-boundary water resources management. The challenges political instability is further exacerbated by the power asymmetries that exist within an international river basin. Whilst countries that are upstream undeniably has more power in controlling trans-boundary water resources, this power may be negated by the political and, perhaps more importantly, military power of downstream nations. This can be seen in the Nile river basin, where Egypt threatens to take military action against other nations that are considering projects that would affect Egypt's access to freshwater from the Nile.
  It could therefore perhaps be said that despite the many efforts to encourage the trans-boundary sharing of water resources in Africa, it must be recognised that such efforts are often carried out between national governments which, at end of the day, is responsible for ensuring the interests of their citizens. As a result, one can laud the positive impacts of TRBOs but the fact is such cooperation can only take place when the interests of the various parties can be taken into account. This blog sets out to do just that: in the coming weeks, I will examine the ways in which TRBOs in Africa operate and the ways in which conflicts of interest could be resolved. It might not be the most exciting or unique blog, but at least through this blog one can hope to understand the intricacies behind trans-boundary water resources management and have a glimpse of what the future has to hold.