A historical legacy: putting conflicts over water resources in the Nile basin to a historical context

As mentioned in an earlier post, much of the conflict between Egypt and other riparian nations in the Nile basin stems from agreements created in the colonial era. It would therefore be appropriate for us to examine these agreements in a bit more detail and understand these agreements, signed some 50 odd years ago could still cast a shadow on current negotiations.

The first set of agreements over the utilisation of water resources in the Nile basin took place in the early part of the 20th century. These are truly colonial agreements: none of the African states (except Ethiopia) were at the negotiations table, as they were all 'represented' by colonial overlords. These series of agreements essentially established the domination of Great Britain in the Nile basin, as no changes to the river flow could take place without prior consent of the British empire. The real game-changer, however, came slightly later at 1929. This was an exchange of notes between Egypt and Great Britain (then representing Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya), formally recognising Egypt's rights to Nile water and assuring that the nation would receive a minimum of 48 billion cubic metres of water per year (Swain, 1997). This agreement has proved to be controversial, as its validity has become a constant source of debate in negotiations between Nile basin nations. Whilst Egypt continues to maintain that the treaty is valid and applicable, other nations argue otherwise. As outlined in what became known as the Nyere Doctrine, it is argued that the agreement was signed by Great Britain and applicable to states under British control, the agreement is automatically voided when the nations declared independence of Great Britain (Okidi, 1994).

Another agreement that still have implications on current negotiations is the 1959 bilateral agreement between Sudan and Egypt. This agreement redivided water allocations between the two nations: Egypt is to receive 55.5 billion cubic metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic metres. This treaty has proved to be crucial for negotiations as Egypt regards the recognition of this treaty (something upstream riparian countries are, predictably, unwilling to do) as the starting point of any negotiations (Cascao, 2009). Sudan and Egypt also agreed to 'present an unified view in any other negotiations concerning the Nile waters' (Carroll, 1999: 280). The coming together of the two strongest powers in region meant that there is significant resistance to any actions that threaten the status quo, and it is only recently when other nations in the region begins to grow in stature that the situation is beginning to change.

Interestingly, whilst many would see these agreements as hindrance to cooperation in the Nile basin, Metawie (2004) actually sees these agreements as signs of bilateral cooperation. Whilst they could be interpreted as bilateral cooperation, it would require some stretch of imagination especially in the case of the 1929 agreement which is in essence a deal between two areas of British control (Egypt being a protectorate of the British empire in all but name at that time). Of course, writing for the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, it is perhaps no surprise that Metawie would like to establish the legitimacy of these agreements and make the case for Egypt to have the greatest say in affairs of the Nile basin due to historic rights.